A. INTRODUCTION
The This question is of profound relevance to the on-going Brexit discussions in Parliament and elsewhere. No matter its outcome, a referral to the CJEU could fundamentally alter the terms of the current debate. Confirmation of revocability allows the possibility of the UK changing its mind and remaining in the EU; confirmation of irrevocability removes any such possibility rendering calls for a second referendum on EU membership redundant.
The fatal deficiencies in the petitioner's claim may appear to make both appeal of the decision and future litigation on the issue by other parties unlikely. However, it is submitted that Wightman could mark the beginning rather than the end of finding a resolution on this 1 R (Miller) The petitioners successfully appealed to the Inner House. Lord Carloway, who delivered the opinion of the court, noted that the petition failed to present a clear, succinct argument (as is required by Somerville). 5 However, because of the important constitutional considerations raised therein, Lord Carloway considered that there might be an argument which would have "a real prospect of success" and that the CJEU would likely respond to any referral. The court therefore granted permission, with time for adjustment of the petition to address the requirements of Somerville.
6
The adjusted petition sought a preliminary reference from the CJEU on whether the UK could unilaterally revoke its Article 50 notification. The petitioners additionally sought, on return of that reference, a declarator specifying "whether, when and how" a revocation could be effected. 
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Lord Boyd first considered the preliminary issue of the case's appropriateness for judicial review. He doubted, citing West, 8 whether the court's supervisory jurisdiction was engaged given there was no alleged misuse of power; this was not, however, within judicial contemplation because it was not a matter of contention between the parties.
9
Lord Boyd thereafter considered three substantive points: whether the question before the court was hypothetical; whether there was a breach of parliamentary privilege; and whether the CJEU would likely accept a reference from the court. He found against the petitioners on all three points.
First, Lord Boyd found that the question of whether the notification was revocable was merely hypothetical so not within the court's concern, per MacNaughton. 10 The UK 18 He also expressed concern that the CJEU would not consider a hypothetical situation and should not be asked to give consideration "without the background of fact essential to a proper determination".
19

C. THE PATH NOT TAKEN
Lord Boyd's decision implied that the petition was without merit. Had the petition been framed differently, however, it is submitted that the court might have resolved otherwise and granted the referral.
The requirements to bring a judicial review action in Scotland are set down in West, namely a "tri-partite relationship" comprising a power conferred by statute or other mechanism onto a decision-maker, whose decisions affect the rights of others. The petitioners were clearly of the view that revocation of the Article 50 withdrawal notification was possible. They could therefore have raised a statutory interpretation argument, suggesting that the discretion afforded to the PM by section 1(1) could encompass also the power to revoke that notification.
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The scope of the PM's power is bounded by section 1(1) to be that "under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union". The explicit association of her powers with the Treaty means that the interpretation of section 1(1) turns on EU law and the interpretation of Article 50. Itself, Article 50 is silent on whether revocation is possible, and there has been no CJEU dicta on its correct interpretation. A CJEU reference is permitted under Article 267
TFEU on "the interpretation of the Treaties" if a court "considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment".
It is submitted both that this is the critical test for whether to make a referral to the CJEU and that this test is satisfied: an interpretation of EU law is required on an issue which is central to the case before the national court, namely whether Article 50 encompasses the power of revocation. Lord Boyd therefore erred when he gave consideration to how a referral would impact upon EU institutions and other Member States during the Brexit negotiations.
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On return of such a reference, should the CJEU confirm that revocation is encompassed within Article 50 then the court would have to decide whether the Government had acted lawfully in relation to its non-exercise of this executive authority.
Judicial review is predominantly concerned with the exercise rather than non-exercise of executive power. However, the non-exercise of a discretionary executive power was successfully reviewed in the case of Fire Brigades Union. 22 Per Lord Nicholls, to establish the unlawful non-exercise of a statutory power, the decision-maker must be shown to have "acted in breach of some duty imposed upon him, or acted improperly in some other respect". 23 That duty can be implied by the court rather than explicitly stated in the enabling Act. Furthermore, it was held that "the Secretary of State [was] under a legal duty to consider whether or not to exercise the power" and could not preclude that consideration altogether through alternative executive action.
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Should the CJEU confirm that Article 50 does encompass powers of both notification of withdrawal and revocation of that notification the discretion accorded to PM under the 2017 Act with regard to the first power by extension should apply to the second power.
Furthermore, the notification of withdrawal would not render the revocation power 
